An Inquiry Into the Human Mind: On the Principles of Common Sense

Framhlið kápu
Bell & Bradfute, and W. Creech, and for T. Cadell jun. and W. Davies, London, 1801 - 478 síður
 

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Common terms and phrases

Vinsælir kaflar

Síða 11 - The labyrinth may be too intricate, and the thread too fine, to be traced through all its windings ; but, if we stop where we can trace it no farther, and secure the ground we have gained, there is no harm done ; a quicker eye may in time trace it farther.
Síða 10 - Could we obtain a distinct and full history of all that hath passed in the mind of a child from the beginning of life and sensation, till it grows up to the use of reason ; how its infant faculties began to work, and how they brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions, and sentiments, which we find in ourselves when we come to be capable of reflection : this would be a treasure of natural history, which...
Síða 431 - It is from the force of this principle that we immediately assent to that axiom upon which all our knowledge of nature is built, That effects of the same kind must have the same cause; for effects and causes, in the operations of nature, mean nothing but signs and the things signified by them.
Síða 177 - I have here supposed that my reader is acquainted with that great modern discovery, which is at present universally acknowledged by all the inquirers into natural philosophy: namely, that light and colours, as apprehended by the imagination, are only ideas in the mind, and not qualities that have any existence in matter.
Síða 10 - ... sensation, till it grows up to the use of reason; how its infant faculties began to work, and how they brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions, and sentiments, which we find in ourselves when we come to be capable of reflection, this would be a treasure of natural history, which would probably give more light into the human faculties, than all the systems of philosophers about them since the beginning of the world.
Síða 6 - ... and methodically, all the operations of the thinking principle within him, which no man was ever able to do, this would be only the anatomy of one particular subject; which would be both deficient and erroneous, if applied to human nature in general.
Síða 10 - ... which we find in ourselves when we come to be capable of reflection ; this would be a treasure of natural history, which would probably give more light into the human faculties, than all the systems of philosophers about them since the beginning of the world. But it is in vain to wish for what nature has not put within the reach of our power.
Síða 349 - ... nerves meet before they come into the brain, the fibres on the right side of both nerves uniting there, and after union going thence into the brain in the nerve which is on the right side of the head, and the fibres on the left side of both nerves uniting in the same place, and after union going into the brain in the nerve which is on the left side of the head, and these two nerves meeting in the brain in...
Síða 152 - ... which may be made by this little organ in things far beyond the reach of any other sense : That by means of it we can find our way in the pathless ocean ; that we can traverse the globe of the earth, determine its figure and dimensions, and delineate every region of it : yea, that we can measure the planetary orbs, and make discoveries in the sphere of the fixed stars.
Síða 172 - ... to be, which is presented to the imagination, it is really in some sort compounded. It involves an unknown cause, and a known effect. The name of colour belongs indeed to the cause only, and not to the effect. But as the cause is unknown, we can form no distinct conception of it, but by its relation to the known effect. And therefore, both go together in the imagination, and are so closely united, that they are mistaken for one simple object of thought.

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