The Icelandic Fisheries: Sustainable and ProfitableFour papers on the Icelandic system of ITQs in the fisheries (Individual Transferable Quotas), in particular the nature of the problem of overfishing, moral and economic considerations on the initial allocation of quotas and lessons for other nations from the Icelandic experience. |
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Arnason auction basis of catch better road boat owners broadcasting Buchanan capelin catch history Coase Coasean demersal fisheries Demsetz economic activities economists effects of economic example externality farmers fertile fishing ground fish stocks fishermen fishing capital fishing community fishing effort fishing fleet fishing rights fishing season fishing vessels Flemish Cap Georgism Gissurarson harmful effects harvest fish Icelandic fishing Icelandic waters individual fishing firms individual quotas Individual Transferable Quotas individual transferable share individual vessel initial allocation interest Irminger Sea leave the fishery Lockean proviso mountain pastures open access operating optimal overfishing owners of fishing ownership Pareto-optimal pelagic pelagic fisheries Pigou Pigovian tax political private property rights problem profit radio frequencies reason rent derivable rent dissipation resource rent restrictions revenue right to harvest set of rules system of individual total allowable catch transferable share quotas University of Iceland unrestricted access utilisation vessel owners worse
Bókfræðilegar upplýsingar
| Titill | The Icelandic Fisheries: Sustainable and Profitable Bindi 1 of Þjóðmálarit RNH og AB |
| Höfundur | Hannes H. Gissurarson |
| Útgefandi | University of Iceland Press, 2015 |
| ISBN | 9935231100, 9789935231109 |
| Length | 112 síður |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |