...leads to the demand for a method to protect against mistakes, Hegel says that this is itself a mistake; "should we not be concerned as to whether this fear of error is not just the error itself?"(73) and "should we not turn around and mistrust this very mistrust?" (74). Indeed, it is in...

...world lies before him for the taking; philosophy is there, obvious, waiting. There is work to be done. If the fear of falling into error sets up a mistrust...whether this fear of error is not just the error itself? (PG 74) This is not to say that there are no problems involved in doing philosophy or that the philosopher...

...fear of Truth — it announces a desire to elude, at any price, an encounter with the Truth: . . . if the fear of falling into error sets up a mistrust...whether this fear of error is not just the error itself? (Hegel, 1977, p. 47) The relation between appearance and Truth should thus be conceived in a dialectically...

...'Introduction' to The Phenomenology of Spitit, trans. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 47. 'Should we not be concerned as to whether this fear...certain ideas about cognition as an instrument and a medium, and assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and this cognition . 1 8 Bennett,...

...however vestigial or fleeting, of the in-itself. Indeed, the skeptical fear of falling into untruth "takes something — a great deal in fact — for...itself in need of prior scrutiny to see if it is true. . . . Above all, it presupposes that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition on the other" (47l....

...emerge at the end (Adorno, 2000: 144). Hegel's response to this charge by Adorno might be as follows. Should we not be concerned as to whether this fear...something — a great deal in fact — for granted... To be specific it takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as an instrument and as a medium,...

...links between the view advanced here and the position taken by Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit. 'If the fear of falling into error sets up a mistrust...this fear of error is not just the error itself.' (Phänomenologie des Geistes [1807], transí. AV Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p....

...sense because we continue to talk about it, even within the confines of Kantian philosophy. Hegel asks: "Should we not be concerned as to whether this fear of error is not just the error itself?" (par. 74). He says: "Above all, it presupposes that the absolute stands on one side and cognition on...