Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason
Duke University Press, 9. apr. 2001 - 378 síđur
The Hungarian émigré Imre Lakatos (1922–1974) earned a worldwide reputation through the influential philosophy of science debates involving Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Sir Karl Popper. In Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason John Kadvany shows that embedded in Lakatos’s English-language work is a remarkable historical philosophy rooted in his Hungarian past. Below the surface of his life as an Anglo-American philosopher of science and mathematics, Lakatos covertly introduced novel transformations of Hegelian and Marxist ideas about historiography, skepticism, criticism, and rationality.
Lakatos escaped Hungary following the failed 1956 Revolution. Before then, he had been an influential Communist intellectual and was imprisoned for years by the Stalinist regime. He also wrote a lost doctoral thesis in the philosophy of science and participated in what was criminal behavior in all but a legal sense. Kadvany argues that this intellectual and political past animates Lakatos’s English-language philosophy, and that, whether intended or not, Lakatos integrated a penetrating vision of Hegelian ideas with rigorous analysis of mathematical proofs and controversial histories of science.
Including new applications of Lakatos’s ideas to the histories of mathematical logic and economics and providing lucid exegesis of many of Hegel’s basic ideas, Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason is an exciting reconstruction of ideas and episodes from the history of philosophy, science, mathematics, and modern political history.
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analysis appear approach become called century chapter claims classical complete concepts conjecture consciousness consistency continuous contradictions created criterion criticism defined described economic error ether example existence experiments explain expressed facts false falsification Feyerabend formal functions given goal Gödel's Hegel Hegelian heuristic historiographical Hungarian Hungary ideas important improved intellectual interpretation kind knowledge labor theory Lakatos Lakatos's language learning limited logic Lukács Marx Marx's Marxism mathematical means method methodology natural needed notion numbers object observations original Party Paul Feyerabend Phenomenology philosophy physics political Popper positive possible practice present problem production profit progress proof prove provides rational reason reconstruction refutations relations relativity represented research programme result role scientific skeptical social standard taken theorem theory thought tion true truth turn understanding University Press writers York
Síđa 14 - Meanwhile, if the fear of falling into error sets up a mistrust of Science, which in the absence of such scruples gets on with the work itself, and actually cognizes something, it is hard to see why we should not turn round and mistrust this very mistrust. Should we not be concerned as to whether this fear of error is not just the error itself?
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