The Construction of Social RealitySimon and Schuster, 11. maí 2010 - 256 síður This short treatise looks at how we construct a social reality from our sense impressions; at how, for example, we construct a ‘five-pound note’ with all that implies in terms of value and social meaning, from the printed piece of paper we see and touch. In The Construction of Social Reality, eminent philosopher John Searle examines the structure of social reality (or those portions of the world that are facts only by human agreement, such as money, marriage, property, and government), and contrasts it to a brute reality that is independent of human agreement. Searle shows that brute reality provides the indisputable foundation for all social reality, and that social reality, while very real, is maintained by nothing more than custom and habit. |
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... intentional, and not all intentionally is conscious. There are, for example, forms of consciousness such as undirected anxiety that do not represent anything; and there are many forms of unconscious intentionality, such as my belief ...
... intentional, and not all intentionally is conscious. There are, for example, forms of consciousness such as undirected anxiety that do not represent anything; and there are many forms of unconscious intentionality, such as my belief ...
Síða
... functions are also assigned when we say “That is an ugly painting.” Because all these are instance of uses to which agents intentionally put objects, I will call them “agentive functions.” Some of the objects to which.
... functions are also assigned when we say “That is an ugly painting.” Because all these are instance of uses to which agents intentionally put objects, I will call them “agentive functions.” Some of the objects to which.
Síða
... intentionally put these objects. Some functions are not imposed on objects to serve practical purposes but are assigned to naturally occurring objects and processes as part of a theoretical account of the phenomena in question. Thus we ...
... intentionally put these objects. Some functions are not imposed on objects to serve practical purposes but are assigned to naturally occurring objects and processes as part of a theoretical account of the phenomena in question. Thus we ...
Síða
... intentionally imposed intentionality on objects and states of affairs that are not intrinsically intentional. There are names in English for the result of this type of imposition of function: They are called “meaning” or “symbolism ...
... intentionally imposed intentionality on objects and states of affairs that are not intrinsically intentional. There are names in English for the result of this type of imposition of function: They are called “meaning” or “symbolism ...
Síða
... intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. In addition to singular intentionality there is also collective intentionality. Obvious examples are cases where I am doing something only as part of our doing something. So ...
... intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. In addition to singular intentionality there is also collective intentionality. Obvious examples are cases where I am doing something only as part of our doing something. So ...
Efni
Creating Institutional Facts | |
Language and Social Reality | |
Iteration | |
Creation | |
Attacks on Realisrn | |
Could There Be | |
Truth and Correspondence | |
Conclusion | |
Name Index | |
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agentive functions argument assigned Background behavior believe brute facts brute physical causal chapter claim collective acceptance collective intentionality concepts consciousness constitutive rules conventional power correspondence theory counts create creation of institutional deontic describe direction of fit disquotation criterion distinction dollar bill entities epistemically objective Everest has snow example exists independently explain external realism human identical with Diogenes imposed imposition of function institutional facts institutional reality institutional structures intentional intrinsic language dependent linguistic logical structure logically equivalent marriage mental normal understanding notion ontologically objective perform performative utterances phenomena philosophical prelinguistic presupposes presupposition pump blood question relation representations require screwdriver sense sentence simply slingshot argument snow is white social facts social reality socially constructed reality sorts specified speech acts status-functions Strawson suppose symbolic teleology term things thought true statements truth conditions unconsciously utterances virtue words X term