The Construction of Social RealitySimon and Schuster, 11. maí 2010 - 256 síður This short treatise looks at how we construct a social reality from our sense impressions; at how, for example, we construct a ‘five-pound note’ with all that implies in terms of value and social meaning, from the printed piece of paper we see and touch. In The Construction of Social Reality, eminent philosopher John Searle examines the structure of social reality (or those portions of the world that are facts only by human agreement, such as money, marriage, property, and government), and contrasts it to a brute reality that is independent of human agreement. Searle shows that brute reality provides the indisputable foundation for all social reality, and that social reality, while very real, is maintained by nothing more than custom and habit. |
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... Explanation of Social Phenomena 7. Does the Real World Exist? Part I: Attacks on Realisrn 8. Does the Real World Exist? Part II: Could There Be a Proof of External Realism? 9. Truth and Correspondence Conclusion Endnotes Name Index ...
... Explanation of Social Phenomena 7. Does the Real World Exist? Part I: Attacks on Realisrn 8. Does the Real World Exist? Part II: Could There Be a Proof of External Realism? 9. Truth and Correspondence Conclusion Endnotes Name Index ...
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... explain my notion of the “Background” of nonconscious nonrepresentational capacities and abilities that enable us to cope with the world. In early drafts of the book I devoted an initial chapter to defending realism, the idea that there ...
... explain my notion of the “Background” of nonconscious nonrepresentational capacities and abilities that enable us to cope with the world. In early drafts of the book I devoted an initial chapter to defending realism, the idea that there ...
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... explain.2 If neither the internal phenomenological nor the external behaviorist point of view is adequate, what then ... explained in terms of, and ultimately eliminated in favor of, what I have elsewhere called the “Background” of ...
... explain.2 If neither the internal phenomenological nor the external behaviorist point of view is adequate, what then ... explained in terms of, and ultimately eliminated in favor of, what I have elsewhere called the “Background” of ...
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... the observers that enable them to create such observer-relative features of the world are intrinsic features of the observers. I will shortly explain this point further. It is not always immediately obvious whether a feature is.
... the observers that enable them to create such observer-relative features of the world are intrinsic features of the observers. I will shortly explain this point further. It is not always immediately obvious whether a feature is.
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... explanation of the distinction to account for this exception as follows: Intrinsic features of reality are those that exist independently of all mental states, except for mental states themselves, which are also intrinsic features of ...
... explanation of the distinction to account for this exception as follows: Intrinsic features of reality are those that exist independently of all mental states, except for mental states themselves, which are also intrinsic features of ...
Efni
Creating Institutional Facts | |
Language and Social Reality | |
Iteration | |
Creation | |
Attacks on Realisrn | |
Could There Be | |
Truth and Correspondence | |
Conclusion | |
Name Index | |
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agentive functions argument assigned Background behavior believe brute facts brute physical causal chapter claim collective acceptance collective intentionality concepts consciousness constitutive rules conventional power correspondence theory counts create creation of institutional deontic describe direction of fit disquotation criterion distinction dollar bill entities epistemically objective Everest has snow example exists independently explain external realism human identical with Diogenes imposed imposition of function institutional facts institutional reality institutional structures intentional intrinsic language dependent linguistic logical structure logically equivalent marriage mental normal understanding notion ontologically objective perform performative utterances phenomena philosophical prelinguistic presupposes presupposition pump blood question relation representations require screwdriver sense sentence simply slingshot argument snow is white social facts social reality socially constructed reality sorts specified speech acts status-functions Strawson suppose symbolic teleology term things thought true statements truth conditions unconsciously utterances virtue words X term