The Construction of Social RealitySimon and Schuster, 11. maí 2010 - 256 síður This short treatise looks at how we construct a social reality from our sense impressions; at how, for example, we construct a ‘five-pound note’ with all that implies in terms of value and social meaning, from the printed piece of paper we see and touch. In The Construction of Social Reality, eminent philosopher John Searle examines the structure of social reality (or those portions of the world that are facts only by human agreement, such as money, marriage, property, and government), and contrasts it to a brute reality that is independent of human agreement. Searle shows that brute reality provides the indisputable foundation for all social reality, and that social reality, while very real, is maintained by nothing more than custom and habit. |
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... consciousness or meaningful speech acts as parts of the physical world? Many of the philosophical problems that most interest me have to do with how the various parts of the world relate to each other—how does it all hang together?—and ...
... consciousness or meaningful speech acts as parts of the physical world? Many of the philosophical problems that most interest me have to do with how the various parts of the world relate to each other—how does it all hang together?—and ...
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... consciousness. And besides, computation is one of those observerrelative, functional phenomena we are seeking to explain.2 If neither the internal phenomenological nor the external behaviorist point of view is adequate, what then is the ...
... consciousness. And besides, computation is one of those observerrelative, functional phenomena we are seeking to explain.2 If neither the internal phenomenological nor the external behaviorist point of view is adequate, what then is the ...
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... consciousness comes intentionality, the capacity of the mind to represent objects and states of affairs in the world other than itself. Not all consciousness is intentional, and not all intentionally is conscious. There are, for example ...
... consciousness comes intentionality, the capacity of the mind to represent objects and states of affairs in the world other than itself. Not all consciousness is intentional, and not all intentionally is conscious. There are, for example ...
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... conscious agents regard it as a screwdriver; but the fact that conscious agents have that attitude is itself an intrinsic feature of the conscious agents. Because mental states, both conscious and unconscious, are themselves intrinsic ...
... conscious agents regard it as a screwdriver; but the fact that conscious agents have that attitude is itself an intrinsic feature of the conscious agents. Because mental states, both conscious and unconscious, are themselves intrinsic ...
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... tree can be used for lumber.” The important thing to see at this point is that functions are never intrinsic to the physics of any phenomenon but are assigned from outside by conscious observers and users. Functions, in short, are.
... tree can be used for lumber.” The important thing to see at this point is that functions are never intrinsic to the physics of any phenomenon but are assigned from outside by conscious observers and users. Functions, in short, are.
Efni
Creating Institutional Facts | |
Language and Social Reality | |
Iteration | |
Creation | |
Attacks on Realisrn | |
Could There Be | |
Truth and Correspondence | |
Conclusion | |
Name Index | |
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agentive functions argument assigned Background behavior believe brute facts brute physical causal chapter claim collective acceptance collective intentionality concepts consciousness constitutive rules conventional power correspondence theory counts create creation of institutional deontic describe direction of fit disquotation criterion distinction dollar bill entities epistemically objective Everest has snow example exists independently explain external realism human identical with Diogenes imposed imposition of function institutional facts institutional reality institutional structures intentional intrinsic language dependent linguistic logical structure logically equivalent marriage mental normal understanding notion ontologically objective perform performative utterances phenomena philosophical prelinguistic presupposes presupposition pump blood question relation representations require screwdriver sense sentence simply slingshot argument snow is white social facts social reality socially constructed reality sorts specified speech acts status-functions Strawson suppose symbolic teleology term things thought true statements truth conditions unconsciously utterances virtue words X term