The Icelandic Fisheries: Sustainable and ProfitableUniversity of Iceland Press, 1. des. 2015 - 112 síður Four papers on the Icelandic system of ITQs in the fisheries (Individual Transferable Quotas), in particular the nature of the problem of overfishing, moral and economic considerations on the initial allocation of quotas and lessons for other nations from the Icelandic experience. |
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